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Abstract: Only since the beginning of this century, the prevention of radicalization has become an
important topic in debates about terrorism and sustainable development in developing countries.
Research has shown that radicalized individuals are not uneducated, but have often completed
secondary or tertiary education. Additionally, it became clear that some extremist groups consider the
school environment as an attractive recruitment place. These findings led to a new approach where the
education sector is considered as a prominent partner in preventing and combating the radicalization
of young individuals. In this article, the potential limitations of the role of the education sector in
developing countries are exposed. Based on previous research, three bottlenecks in the education
sector were found: unequal access to education, poor quality of education and the relationship
between education and employment. In order to strengthen the role of education for sustainable
development in developing countries, it is recommended that equal access to education is improved,
that schools invest in the creation of safe spaces for their students, that not only secondary but also
primary and tertiary education are involved in policy strategies regarding radicalization, and that the
job market is adjusted to the educational level of graduated students.
Keywords: radicalization; violent extremism; education; prevention; developing countries

1. Introduction
Until two decennia ago, researchers and politicians focused primarily on physical security
measures to prevent terrorist-related incidents. Only since the beginning of this century have the
concepts of extremism and radicalism occurred more often in debates about terrorism, and increased
attention is paid to measures with the aim of preventing individuals from having radical thoughts [1].
After the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the premise grew that a focus on individuals who are
actively planning terrorist acts is not enough; it is also necessary to include those people who may
anticipate violent crimes in the future in policy strategies.
Until now, the concept of radicalization has not been universally understood in the same way. As
studies about radicalization processes were mostly carried out in a conceptual instead of empirical way,
there are multiple definitions available, but there still does not exist an unambiguous conceptualization
that can be applicable to all individuals or groups. Based on various definitions, Veldhuis and
Staun [2] concluded that radicalization can be defined in a broad and narrow context. In a broad way,
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radicalization can be considered as “a social and psychological process of incrementally experienced
commitment to extremist political or religious ideology” [3] (p. 152). In a more narrow view, reference
can be made to violent radicalization where the use of force is accepted to achieve the indicated goals [2].
By linking radicalization to violent behavior, the concept of violent extremism can be mentioned.
Although in literature both terms are often confused, according to Pressman and Flockton [4], they can
be considered as a continuum. Individuals can become convinced of radical thoughts that are in
conflict with the dominant culture with the aim to cause political, religious or social change, without
justifying the use of force. However, it is also possible that people do consider this use of force
as a legally accepted way to achieve change, which refers to violent extremism. The boundary
between radicalism and violent extremism can be very diffuse as radicalized individuals who do not
physically participate in acts of terrorism can play a prominent role in other domains, such as the
recruitment or indoctrination of others. With recruitment, we refer to the dynamic process by which a
willing or unwilling individual is encouraged or dissuaded from joining a group [5], while during the
indoctrination process the individual is inculcated with extremist beliefs [6]. Sieckelinck et al. [7] (p. 330)
argued that radicalization can also be described in a pedagogical sense as it “occurs when a child starts
to develop political or religious ideas and agency that are fundamentally different from the educational
environment’s or mainstream’s expectations.” This focus on the pedagogical aspects led to a renewed
interest in the education sector as a prominent partner in preventing and combating the radicalization
of individuals [1]. As history shows that education can play a key role in the behavior and beliefs of
individuals, it is being seen as one of the main places where radicalization can be prevented from
occurring or developing further [8]. This key role of education was first confirmed at the launch of the
United Nations Secretary-General’s “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” in December 2015.
This plan focuses on the most necessary preventive measures for individuals who join violent extremist
groups. Quality education is seen as one of the ways to address the drivers of radicalization [9].
Additionally, the United Nations Security Council highlighted the role of education in the Resolutions
2178 and 2250, where the need for quality education is emphasized [10,11]. UNESCO’s Executive
Board published a Decision that underlines the importance of education as a tool to prevent violent
extremism and terrorism as well as genocide, racial and religious intolerance, war crimes and crimes
against humanity worldwide. It is argued that education is necessary to improve societal commitment
processes and to prevent violent extremism, whether it is provided through school systems, clubs and
community associations or at home [12].
While currently the majority of research focuses on radicalization in European countries, a growing
number of development practitioners are showing interest in the prevention strategies for radicalization
in developing countries [1]. The increased attention mainly results from the fact that most terrorism
victims have originated in developing countries as the majority of terrorist attacks occurred in only
six countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan and Somalia [13]. Additionally, as violence
can cause instability, this may have a negative impact on the sustainable development outcomes of
terror-related countries [14]. In Tunisia and Egypt, for example, huge declines in tourism and foreign
investment have caused a decrease in growth rates [15].
In this article, the role of education in the radicalization of young individuals in developing
countries is examined by conducting a literature review. Databases Google Scholar and Web of
Science were consulted in search of articles about radicalization, violent extremism and the role of
the education sector in developing countries. While defining developing countries is fraught with
difficulty, this paper will focus on the categorization of the United Nations, which uses the human
development index (HDI) to categorize countries. Based on life expectancy, educational attainment,
and adjusted real income, 151 countries can be categorized as developing countries [16]. Only studies
focusing on these countries were included in the selection of articles. Searches were conducted during
September and October 2019. The most recent publications were searched for, however, no restrictions
were made regarding the publishing date of the articles.
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First, the relationship between education and radicalization will be explained according to the
educational level of radicalized individuals and the attractiveness of school environments in the
recruitment process of extremist groups. Subsequently, three potential limitations of the education
sector in developing countries are presented. Based on these findings, recommendations are made
for policymakers and researchers who are focusing on the role of education in the prevention
of radicalization of young individuals with the aim of sustaining peace and creating sustainable
development in developing countries. At the end of the article, a brief conclusion sums up the findings
and recommendations.
2. Relationship between Education and Radicalization
2.1. Level of Education of Radicalized Individuals
Research on radicalization shows that mainly young men between the ages of 15 and 25 are
active in the role of offender, a conclusion that seems to be applicable to all regions and cultures
worldwide [17]. In Mauritania, for example, young people who were arrested for terrorist-related
activities were found between the ages of 16 and 24 [18]. Hutson et al. [19] concluded that in the Middle
East, males between 15 and 25 years old are more likely than any other demographic group to engage
in terrorism or political violence. In a large part of the literature on Islamic extremism, radicalization is
linked to the adolescent phase [7]. According to Silber and Bhatt [6], the radicalization process can be
distinguished in four phases: (1) pre-radicalization, (2) self- identification, (3) indoctrination and (4)
jihadization. At the first stage, individuals have not been exposed to extremist beliefs and they are
leading relatively normal lives. Self-identification refers to individuals’ introduction to and eventual
embrace of extremist beliefs. During these first two phases, which are observed with individuals
between 15 and 35 years old, radical ideas and attitudes are formed. At the third stage, individuals’
extremist beliefs intensify and they view violence as necessary to supporting these beliefs. During the
fourth stage, the final steps are taken toward violence as the terrorist group or movement’s goals take
complete precedence for individuals.
The study of Silber and Bhatt [6] also showed that most radicalized people have obtained a
degree in secondary or higher education. This is in contrast with the idea that participants of terrorist
acts are rather low-skilled. Additionally, Sageman [20] concluded, based on 172 biographies of
Salafi-Jihadists that more than 60% of them have obtained a degree. 88% of the leaders (n = 25) of these
groups completed higher studies, of which 20% (n = 5) have obtained a PhD degree. Krueger and
Maleckova [21] found in their study that a large majority of terrorists from the Middle East obtained a
higher educational degree. The 19 perpetrators involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were also not
poorly educated and a large number of Al-Qaeda members appeared to be of middle-class level and
received education at university [22]. Osama Bin Laden, the founder of Al-Qaeda, graduated as an
engineer and his successor, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, completed a master’s degree in surgery. Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, had a PhD degree in Islamic theology [23]. The British sociologists
Gambetta and Hertog [24] confirmed these findings and concluded in their research that 196 out of 284
examined convicted international terrorists have received higher education, which is a high number in
comparison with the average level of education in their countries of origin. The World Bank concluded
in a report about Daesh recruitment that the average number of years of education of the recruits
exceeds the regional average of their region of origin [25]. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a difference
of five years of education, while in North Africa and the Middle East, a difference of three years can be
observed [26].
However, not every study makes the same conclusions. Gill [27], for example, indicated that
there does not exist a clear profile of the demographic characteristics of suicide bombers. The level
of education varies from low-skilled to very well-educated offenders. A report prepared by the
British House of Commons [28], which was developed after the bombings in London in July 2005,
also does not directly link the terrorists’ profile with higher education. According to Taşpınar [29],
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mainly uneducated young men from the Casablanca slums were recruited by the Islamic Combatant
Group, a Moroccan Jihadist organization. In Sierra Leone and Nigeria, the majority of extremist groups
consisted of young individuals who were homeless, unemployed, unmarried and had no education [30].
Kiendrebeogo and Ianchovichina [31] examined the characteristics of radicalized individuals of 27
developing countries and concluded that the typical profile of the radicalized individual is more likely
to be a young, uneducated and unemployed individual.
In other studies, a combination of well-educated and less educated participants of violent extremist
groups was found. For example, Oyefusi [32] indicated, in his study about rebel groups in the Niger
Delta, that often a combination is made between a large number of less educated youth who consider
participation as an upgrade in social status and economic opportunities and a smaller group of
well-educated individuals who are mainly motivated by political or ideological aspects. In Rwanda,
the organizers of the genocide were political elites who were trying to obtain more power, supported
by the middle-class who were afraid of a loss of privilege and a large group of poorer and less educated
individuals [33].
2.2. School Environments as Recruitment Places for Extremist Groups
Terrorist organizations in many places all over the world consider school environments as attractive
recruitment places [34]. The Home Affairs Committee [35] refers to three platforms where extremist
groups recruit their members: prisons, the internet and the school environment. Over the past two
decades, enrollment rates in schools have increased across the developing world [36]. In 2014, globally,
91% of children enrolled in primary education, while in low and lower middle-income countries,
respectively, 81% and 90% of children participated. Worldwide, 84% of children enrolled in lower
secondary education in 2014. In low and lower middle-income countries, respectively, 65% and 80%
of children participated. 63% of children worldwide enrolled in upper secondary education, which
ranged from 40% in low-income countries to 52% in lower middle-income countries. The UNESCO
Institute for Statistics [37] revealed that in 2016, 215.9 million young people enrolled in higher education.
The lowest numbers are found in Central Asia, where 2 million students participated. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, 7.4 million youths enrolled, while respectively, 26.2 and 10.8 million students followed higher
studies in Latin America and the Arab States. The increased presence of many young individuals
in educational systems contributed to the attractiveness of the school environment in recruitment
strategies of radical organizations [20].
Additionally, a large number of studies emphasized the opportunities of already existing networks
in school environments for recruiters [20,38]. Latif [39], for example, indicated that university campuses
in Iraq became central locations for radicalization and recruitment by violent groups. Another example
can be found in West Africa during the 1980s, where extremist groups started intensively to provide
education, housing, health and employment services in regions with high poverty rates. The Islamic
groups used their provision of social services to recruit new members. Especially for young individuals,
membership in these radical groups provided them new social statuses with more authority and
responsibility and at the same time, the opportunities of housing, employment, marriage and religious
education [30].
In Mauritania, recruitment of radicalized youths sometimes occurs in madrasas (Islamic schools)
or religious seminaries. In these educational systems, a space for interaction between youth who are
prone to violent ideas and those who are not is created. This contrast often leads to more receptiveness
of madrasa graduates for ideas of violent extremism [40]. After the breakdown of the Iraqi state in 2003,
powerful student groups emerged at the university campuses. In this context of breakdown, the higher
educational institutions became ideological battlegrounds and fertile spaces for the recruitment of
extremist groups [41].
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3. Potential Bottlenecks of the Education Sector in Developing Countries
3.1. Limited Access to Education
As described in the previous sections, there is no coherent view of the relationship between
the educational level of young individuals and their radical beliefs or participation in terrorist acts.
However, econometric analyses showed that a relationship can be found between countries or regions
with low educational levels and their risk of conflict. According to these analyses, unequal access
to education often becomes a source of tension, which leads to radicalization, conflict, violence and
rebellions [26].
Moser and Rodgers [42] argued that there exists a relationship between violence and unequal
access to education, employment, health or basic physical infrastructure. Situations where severe
inequality is widespread heighten the potential for frustrated and excluded populations which may lead
to an increased number of young individuals participating in different forms of violence. Breidlid [43]
argued that deep-rooted grievances about the unequal access to educational systems in Sudan is said
to be one of the reasons for the ongoing civil war. In Sierra Leone, the failure of the government to
provide qualitative and equal distribution of education for young individuals led many of them to
join rebel groups [44,45]. The issue of unequal access to education seems to be not only relevant for
primary and secondary education, as too often discrimination sneaks in the admission processes for
universities. As this was the case for the Tamil youth in Sri Lanka, this provided one of the main
impulses for youth to join the military movements in the North during the 1970s [46].
Shafiq and Sinno [47] argued that the relationship between the educational level of a country and
the risk of conflict is not straightforward. Political and socioeconomic variables may have a mediating
role in this connection. This means that poor political and socioeconomic conditions may increase
the chance of terrorist acts, while in favorable conditions, education may further reduce terrorism.
Brockhoff et al. [48] concluded, based on an examination of 133 countries over 23 years, that lower
educational levels such as primary education lead to more terrorism for a cluster of less socioeconomic
and politico-institutional developing countries. Higher levels of education, such as university education,
reduce domestic terrorism for a cluster of countries with more favorable conditions [1].
Referring to the well-educated profiles of individuals who participated in recent terrorist attacks,
previous research has shown that equal access to education does not per se minimize the risk of
radicalization [1]. Mercy Mercy Corps [49] confirmed these findings after carrying out a study to
examine the impact of access to formal education on participation and support of political violence of
Somali youths. The results show that although the improvement of access to secondary education
reduced the participation in political violence by 16%, the support for violence increased with 11%.
However, when the improvement of access to secondary education is combined with civic engagement
opportunities that allow young individuals to carry out community action campaigns, a decrease of
respectively, 14% and 20% for participation in and support for political violence is measured. This means
that a combination of educational initiatives with civic engagement activities steer youth away from
a path towards violence. Therefore, providing education is not enough to prevent radicalization or
recruitment of young individuals. Brockhoff et al. [50] argued that equal access to education only has
an impact on processes of radicalization when it is combined with a good quality of education.
3.2. Poor Quality of Education
Steer et al. [51] argued that while Arab countries invested successfully in equal access to education,
the quality is substandard. Based on an analysis of 13 Arab countries, the researchers concluded that
48% of lower secondary school students fail the basic numeracy and literacy tests. Even students who
obtain higher scores, still do not meet the required skills of the 21st century market place. Ladbury
and Hussein [52] indicated that the style of education in Pakistan’s state schools and madrasas causes
raised expectations of young individuals while the lack of skills hinder meeting these hopes in practice.
Richards [53] argued that the educational systems in the Middle East, which are often based on rote
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memorization and the obligation to obey the authorities without asking any questions, leave young
students vulnerable to extremist narratives.
In this light, Martin-Rayo [54] argued that the quality of education is a determinant factor in the
radicalization processes of young individuals. Youths who received even a little quality education are
intended to view violence in a more negative way and are less susceptible to ideological brainwashing
by radical groups. He refers, in this case, to the Somalis who are living in refugee camps in Kharaz
in Yemen. Due to different factors such as language barriers, corrupt payments or violence directed at
the Somali students, they experienced institutionalized discrimination in the education system. Upon
graduation, some of these students openly showed their interest in joining Al-Qaeda. Agbiboa [55]
argued that poor education infrastructure and a lack of dedicated teachers have contributed to the
radicalization of many youths in West Africa and the Sahel.
Additionally, the content of the curricula largely influences the quality of education. When during
the Cold War, communism and the Soviet Union were considered as the biggest security threats to
the West, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the educational
programs in refugee camps in Pakistan and Pakistani madrasas. Between 1984 and 1994, more than
13 million textbooks were distributed among young individuals in Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani
madrasas. As these textbooks mainly consisted of hate curriculum focused on the Soviets, this led
to the creation of a generation of radicalized youth [56]. In Rwanda, research has shown that the
curricula and teaching methods smothered critical thinking, which impacted individuals’ responses
to the genocide [57]. In 2015, five madrasas in Uganda were closed over allegations that they were
educating students to become extremists in favor of a Congolese armed group who were attacking the
African Union [58].
Macaluso [1] indicated that the solution to radicalization is not education as such, but the
quality of education that is provided. It is important that students learn from other disciplines in
order to be open to other opinions, to have intelligent and critical discussions and to understand
international and domestic realities. According to Shafiq and Sinno [47], the direct effect of education
on radicalization depends on the content of the curricula and the values which are inculcated in the
educational institutions.
3.3. Weak Relationship between Education and the Job Market
As shown previously, many researchers emphasize the importance of high-quality education,
but according to some of them, the relationship between education and the available job market is
even more important [15,46]. They argue that a combination of quality education, but limited job
opportunities, may cause a breeding ground for radicalization. A report of the Combating Terrorism
Centre of 2016 revealed that, based on an analysis of 4600 personnel records of Daesh foreign fighters
from the Islamic State, most of them were relatively well-educated in comparison to the educational
level of their home countries, but most held low-skilled positions [59]. According to Bhatia and
Ghanem [15], frustrations over not being able to secure job opportunities in accordance with their
level of education could have played a role in the radicalization process. Zaidi [60] indicated that
during poor economic times, better educated or qualified individuals are often unemployed which
increases the attractiveness of finding simple solutions for complex problems, such as engaging in
crime to solve financial problems. If educational attainment raises expectations about employment
opportunities that cannot be fulfilled, this can cause a reality-expectation nexus which may create
opportunities for extremist groups. ISIS, for example, includes the promise of job opportunities in its
recruitment campaign [61]. Research among Sri Lankan youth showed that insufficient employment
for well-educated individuals with high aspirations led to strong competition for positions, patronage
and disillusionment and unrest. Both the Sinhalese People’s Liberation Front and the Tamil Tigers
recruited their cadres from the rural youth who were well-educated but frustrated [62]. Today, in
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a university degree rather reduces than increases the
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chance of finding a job. An educated person seems to have no advantages on the job market, but even
more disadvantages because his or her expectations cannot be fulfilled [26].
Additionally, in Nigeria, radicalization processes have been enabled by disappointment about
employment prospects for many young individuals who had migrated from rural to semi-rural areas
with the aim to find a decent job [63]. Under-employment is seen as a major problem for young adults
as jobs with little prospect for advancement may be considered as ‘dead-end work’ and can be a
source of embarrassment, social separation and frustration. For example, many young unemployed
ex-combatants participated in the riots in Liberia in 2004 [64]. De Jong [65] indicated that the regional
uprising in Casamance in Senegal was caused due to youth disaffection and unemployment.
Collier [66] concluded in an econometric study that conflict is most concentrated in countries
with low employment rates. According to his analysis, a country will decrease its risk of conflict
by four percent when it increases the employment rate with ten percent. According to Brockhoff et
al. [67], this makes sense, as countries who are able and willing to provide opportunities and allow
those expectations to drive change for the increasingly educated population can turn out positive.
In countries or regions who cannot or do not want to respond to the growing level of expectations,
the pressure for forced change may build up.
4. Recommendations for the Education Sector
The current global security agenda emphasizes on the importance of education in challenging
violent extremism and radicalization, and the prevention of participation of young individuals in
extremist groups [68]. Unfortunately, there does not exist a perfect ‘recipe’ to prevent or eradicate
radicalization among young individuals. Burde et al. [69] (p. vi) argued that “no robust evidence
shows the best ways for education to counter extremism.” While some studies show that equal access
to education and an improvement of the national levels of educational attainment limits radicalization
and the participation of individuals in violent extremism, other researchers are emphasizing on the
importance of the quality of education and the availability of job opportunities [70]. However, based
on the findings of previous research, some recommendations for the education sector in developing
countries can be made. First, policy should provide sufficient resources to improve equal access to
education as research has shown that youths who are not in school are at greater risk of radicalization,
recruitment into violent groups or participating in criminal events [71,72]. Educational initiatives
provide opportunities to create awareness about the recruitment strategies of extremist groups and can
stimulate students to think about their future plans [71]. This means that education must become a more
attractive platform in comparison to other alternatives, such as involvement in violence. Education
should be accessible for everyone and especially for the most marginalized populations [73]. However,
it should be questioned whether an improvement of access to education suffices, as we have seen that
also well-educated youths participate in violent extremist groups [71].
This brings us to the second recommendation, which is based on the conclusion of Rose [26]
(p. 63), who argued that “education itself is not the answer: it needs to be the right sort of education.”
Many researchers emphasize the importance of the school as a safe space for young individuals where
they can explore their ideas freely. Pratchett et al. [74] argued that education can be effective in
challenging ideology when it focuses on the allowance for individuals to develop independent thinking
and creating space to question and challenge themselves and others. It provides the opportunity to
introduce different ideas to young individuals to counter “group think” and possible radical views [59].
As education has the ability to change values and attitudes, this can also contain a negative effect in
which school curricula are used as powerful means to mobilize young individuals by exacerbating
inequalities or raising unreal expectations. Therefore, it should be the aim of the educational setting to
serve as a safe environment where students can find a more inclusive and less rigid expression for
their ideals [46]. Osler [75] argued that in this safe learning environment, it must be possible to talk
about sensitive political issues and ideals without offending any person or group. Davies [76] (p. 160)
described this, as follows: “In safe spaces, turbulence has to be created, in order to investigate how it
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can be resolved—and whether even more or different sorts of turbulence are called for.” According
to Macaluso [1], critical thinking can function as resistance against the pull factors of radicalization.
Therefore, schools should be environments where critical thinking is cultivated, and students are
stimulated to ask questions and learn to think beyond taboos and common assumptions. This way,
they can transfer their critical thinking skills to other situations outside the school environment.
Third, while at the moment, most attention is paid to secondary schools in developing countries,
it is important that also primary and university education are included in the reform strategies [46].
In the Millennium Development Goals, the promise to ensure that all children complete primary school
is seen as an essential step towards reducing poverty and achieving sustainability [77]. Linking this to
radicalization, Mercer [78] argued that universal access to primary education is of high importance
in order to build the necessary resilience among young students [1]. The improvement of personal
resilience should lead to better coping strategies for life pressures and challenges and the use of critical
thinking skills to appreciate different perspectives [79]. As attitudes and behaviors start to develop
during childhood, investment in primary education is needed [1]. Barakat and Milton [80] (p. 1) argued
that higher educational institutions “ . . . help shelter and protect an important subset of young men and
women during crisis situations, maintaining their hopes in the future, and preventing them from being
driven into the hands of violent groups.” According to Ozerdem and Jacoby [81], higher education can
play a key role in reintegration processes, breaking up armed groups and instituting programs for
collecting weapons. For example, research showed that while a large number of university students
fought during the war in Libya, the re-opening of the campuses in post-war periods contributed
positively towards stability in the country [82]. Opening up universities to critical thinking can
contribute to the prevention of radicalization of its students [26].
Finally, as previous research has shown that well-educated persons are more likely to support
violent extremism when they are unemployed or underemployed, changes in the education sector
should be accompanied by reforms of the job market [15]. This means that the interaction between
unemployment and higher education needs more attention. Policymakers should not only focus on
education and the supply of labor, but also on the demand for labor. Job markets must be reformed in
order to deal with this phenomenon of unemployed but educated young individuals. As education
and skills play a key role in securing employment, this can break the cycle in which joining an extremist
group is considered as the only viable option [59].
These recommendations should be integrated into the sustainable development processes of
developing countries. The potential overlap between the prevention of radicalization and creating
sustainable development is especially evident when looking at human security, which includes
environmental, economic, health and crime-related threats. The World Bank’s 2011 World Development
Report [83] indicated that the developmental consequences and human costs of violence are severe
and that violence has been the main constraint to create sustainable development. The Frontlines
report of the United Nationals Development Programme [16] emphasizes on the central role of youth
in the effective and long-term prevention of violent radicalization. It is argued that focusing on
young individuals by protecting their rights, fostering their resilience and systematically integrating
meaningful participation will serve as a tool for promoting sustainable development and peace.
Finally, it should be mentioned that not only the socioeconomic circumstances of individuals
play a role in determining whether they are driven towards extremism by push factors or attracted by
pull factors. For each country, community and individual, unique dynamics defy generalizations [84].
According to the United Nations’ 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy [85], these dynamics include
a lack of good governance, socioeconomic marginalization, political exclusion, prolonged unresolved
conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights,
and ethnic, national and religious discrimination.
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5. Conclusions
This article had the aim to examine the role of education in the radicalization processes of young
individuals in developing countries. Previous research has shown that the image of the uneducated
participant of a violent extremist group does not match with the actual profiles of radicalized youths.
It became clear that radical movements do not only recruit low-skilled but also well-educated
young individuals. School environments act in these processes often as attractive recruitment places.
Based on these findings, the education sector is considered as a prominent partner in the prevention
of radicalization and violent extremism. Three potential limitations of the education sector were
examined. The unequal access to education, the poor quality of education and the relationship between
education and employment were found as potential causes that could increase the vulnerability of
youth for radicalization. In order to tackle these limitations, four recommendations were made.
Firstly, equal access to education should ensure that going to school is considered as a more viable
option in comparison to extremist groups. Secondly, by creating a safe school environment where
critical thinking and free exploration of different ideas are stimulated, the vulnerability of students
to radicalization can be reduced. Thirdly, changes in the education sector should not only focus on
secondary education, but attention should also be paid to primary and university levels. Fourthly, an
adaptation of the job market to the educational level of the graduated students is needed in order to
prevent frustration of youths which could make them more vulnerable to radicalization. Finally, it
should be mentioned that while changes in the education sector can lead to very positive results on
the medium term, this should definitely be accompanied by sustainable interventions in other sectors
and domains. Current research suggests that there is no universal indicator or determinant of support
for or participation in violent extremism. It is considered as a non-linear process that results from a
combination of different factors that shape an individual’s trajectory [84].
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